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MISMATCHING CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES
AND COMMON STOCK UNDER
SECTION 16(b)
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 was intended 2
to deter insiders 3 from using information not available to the investing
public in order to earn "short swing" profits.4 The statute was designed
to be read literally and applied mechanically, so that its scope would be
understood and its application predictable.5 Unfortunately, application
of the statute to business transactions often produces inconsistent results
that do not serve the purposes of the statute.6
1. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
2. See infra note 5.
3. Section 16(a), 15 U.S.C § 78p(a) (1982), provides that officers, directors, and 10% beneficial
owners of an issuer are "insiders" and subject to 16(b), as well as to 16(a) reporting requirements.
4. "Short-swing" profits are profits resulting from purchases and sales of the issuer's equity
securities occurring within a six month period. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
5. Senate Reports demonstrate that curtailing improper speculative use of information avail-
able to insiders and not to the investing public was the primary concern of section 16(b). See S. REP.
No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1934). The legislative history demonstrates that Congress recog-
nized past abuses both by major stockholders and by officers and directors of the corporation:
Among the most vicious practices unearthed. . . was the flagrant betrayal of their fiduci-
ary duties by directors and officers of the corporations who used their positions of trust and
the confidential information which came to them in such positions, to aid them in their
market activities. Closely allied to this type of abuse was the unscrupulous employment of
inside information by large stockholders who, while not directors and officers, exercised
sufficient control over the destinies of their companies to enable them to acquire and profit
by information not available to others.
Id. at 68. See also S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1934).
The most important witness to appear at the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency hear-
ing concerning section 16 (then proposed section 15), was Thomas G. Corcoran, a drafter of section
16, from the office of the Counsel for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. According to Corco-
ran, the objective of the short-swing profit provision is:
[t]o prevent directors receiving the benefits of short-term speculative swings on the securi-
ties of their own companies, because of inside information. The profit on such transaction
under the bill would go to the corporation. You hold the director, irrespective of any
intention or expectation to sell the security within 6 months after, because it will be abso-
lutely impossible to prove the existence of such intention or expectation, and you have to
have this crude rule of thumb, because you cannot undertake the burden of having to prove
that the director intended, at the time he bought, to get out on a short swing.
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. Res.
84, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6557 (1934). For further excerpts from Senate hearings concerning section
16(b), see generally Note, Exceptions to Liability Under Section 16(b): A Systematic Approach, 87
YALE L.J. 1430, 1430-31 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Exceptions to Liability Under Section
16(b)]. See infra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text (conversion transactions); notes 65-75 and
accompanying text (hostile tender offers); notes 89-114 and accompanying text (transactions involv-
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Recently, in Gund v. First Florida Banks, 7 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that an insider violated 16(b)
when he sold his convertible debentures and purchased common stock, 8
even though the market prices of the two securities fluctuated indepen-
dently. 9 The Eleventh Circuit mechanically applied the statute to the
Gund transaction and forced the insider to disgorge his profits.' 0 Gund is
a typical example of decisions where 16(b) has been applied even though
the economics of the transactions preclude any possibility of speculative
abuse. 11
This note begins by examining judicially imposed limitations on the
scope of 16(b), and demonstrates that 16(b) does not always operate sim-
ply and effectively.12 In reality, courts have interpreted the provision in
light of the complex financial transactions in which issues of 16(b) liabil-
ity arise. The note then argues that the Gund transaction presented no
opportunity for speculative abuse and that the Eleventh Circuit reached
an incorrect result when it found the insider liable for 16(b) profits.' 3
The note suggests that purchases and sales of convertible debt securities
and underlying stock should be matched for 16(b) purposes only when
the market prices of the two classes of securities fluctuate according to
their conversion ratio. 14 Conversely, the note suggests that where the
two classes of securities are traded independently, as in Gund, the ration-
ale for treating convertible debentures as equity securities within the
meaning of the short-swing profit provision does not apply.' 5 In this en-
vironment, purchases and sales of the two classes of securities should not
be matched to form 16(b) profits.
ing sale of convertible debentures and purchases of common stock); note 116 (transaction involving
sale of warrants and purchase of common stock).
7. 726 F.2d 682 (11th Cir. 1984).
8. Id. at 687.
9. Id. at 684.
10. Id. Gund is discussed infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
11. See, eg., Texas Int'l Airlines v. National Airlines, 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983) (failed
hostile tender offeror held liable for 16(b) profits where it sold securities for cash prior to merger of
target with third party), cerL denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984) (discussed infra notes 67-75 and accom-
panying text); Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Shulte, 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.) (conversion of convertible
securities treated as 16(b) purchase), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (discussed infra notes 16-18
and accompanying text).
12. See infra notes 16-86 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 87-114 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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II. THE SCOPE OF SECTION 16(b): THE ILLUSORY BRIGHT LINE
A. The Early Objective Approach: Convertible Securities.
Section 16(b) allows an issuer or shareholder to recover profits
earned by "insiders" on a purchase and sale, or sale and purchase, of the
issuer's equity securities, 16 taking place within a six month period. 17 The
provision was intended by its drafter to be mechanically applied to deter
speculative abuse of inside information.' 8 The drafter felt that "insiders
could exploit information not generally available to others to secure
quick profits."' 19 Congress feared that such trading might endanger the
Securities Exchange Act's goal of insuring "fair and honest markets."
20
As the Supreme Court has stated, "the only method Congress deemed
effective to curb the evils of insider trading was a 'flat rule' taking the
profits out of a class of transactions in which the possibility of abuse was
believed to be intolerably great."'2 '
16. "Equity security" is defined to include "any stock or similar security; or any security con-
vertible, with or without consideration into such a security, or carrying any warrant or right ......
15 U.S.C. § 76c(a)(1 1) (1982) (emphasis added).
17. Section 16(b) reads as follows:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been obtained
by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship to the issuer, any
profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity
security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six
months, . . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention
on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or officer in entering into such transac-
tion. . . . Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity . . . by the
issuer, or by the owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in the behalf of the
issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after request or
shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter. . . . This subsection shall not be
construed to cover any transaction where such beneficial owner was not such both at the
time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and purchase, of the security involved, or any
transaction or transactions which the Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as
not comprehended within the purpose of this subsection.
15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
18. See supra note 5.
The provision's intended objective approach is expressed clearly in its language: "irrespective of
any intention on the part" of the insider. Where the conditions of section 16(b) are met, the insiders
must disgorge profits from the transactions. See also Note, Corporations--Securities Exchange Act of
1934-Partial Avoidance of Section 16(b) Liability Through Use of the Split Sale Device, 47 TUL. L.
REV. 1191, 1195 (1973) (noting that although 16(b) was not intended to act as a "general anti-fraud"
provision, it was designed to "absolutely prohibit certain transactions," regardless of the actual in-
tent of the insider).
19. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 592 (1973) (citing S.
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1934) and S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1934),
both of which noted the widespread abuses of information and betrayal of fiduciary obligations
among insiders).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982).
21. Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418, 422 (1972); see also Smolowe v.
Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir.) ("It is apparent. . . from the language of section 16(b)
itself, as well as from Congressional hearings, that the only remedy which its framers deemed effec-
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Park & Tilford, Inc. v. Shulte,22 decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1947, is representative of the early,
mechanical applications of section 16(b). Park & Tilford involved an in-
sider's conversion of preferred stock into common stock, and subsequent
sale of the common stock within six months of the conversion. The court
treated the conversion as a "16(b) purchase" of common stock and
matched it with the subsequent sale of common stock.23 Where this "ob-
jective" 24 approach is taken, a plaintiff suing to recover profits need show
only the insider status of the defendant, the purchase and sale of the
corporation's equity securities within six months, and the profit made
from the transaction. The plaintiff need not show that the transaction
provided an opportunity for speculative abuse of inside information. 25
Objective application of this statute to conversion transactions pro-
duced disappointing results, however, and in two later cases, Blau v. Max
Factor & Co. 26 and Blau v. Lamb, 27 courts declined to treat a conversion
of convertible securities as a purchase of the underlying securities for
section 16(b) purposes.28
In 1947, Max Factor, a family-owned corporation, conducted a pub-
tive for this reform was the imposition of a liability based on an objective measure of proof."), cert.
denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943).
22. 160 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947).
23. Id. at 987-88.
24. "Objective" application of section 16(b) refers to a literal, mechanical application of the
statute. See, eg., Tomlinson, Section 16(b): A Single Analysis of Purchases and Sales-Merging the
Objective and Pragmatic Analyses, 1981 DUKE L.J. 941, 944-47 ("This approach requires only a
factual inquiry: has a transfer for value occurred?").
Other cases applying an objective analysis include: Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 352 F.2d 156
(3d Cir. 1965) (conversion of convertible debentures into common stock held a 16(b) sale); Smolowe
v. Delendo, 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943) (not necessary that shares sold within six months actually be
the same shares purchased within the six month period; sales and purchases during the time period
will be matched so that defendant disgorges the highest profit possible).
25. See Tomlinson, supra note 24, at 944 (objective analysis described); see also Wentz, Refining
a Crude Rule: The Pragmatic Approach to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70
Nw. U.L. REv. 221, 227-28 (1975) ("A court applying the objective approach as formulated in
Smolowe and Park & Tilford, and recognizing that Congress intended section 16(b) to control mar-
ket manipulation and insider trading, will construe the statute broadly in order to restrict and deter
such activity." (footnote omitted)).
26. 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 892 (1965).
27. 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
28. Id. at 522; Max Factor, 342 F.2d at 309.
Other cases in which courts have rejected objective analysis on the facts and have instead ex-
plored the potential for speculative abuse include: Petteys v. Butler, 367 F.2d 528, 537 (8th Cir.
1966) (conversion of convertible preferred stock into common stock held not a section 16(b) sale),
cert denied, 385 U.S. 1006 (1967); Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 1958) (facts
similar to Petteys), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959); Blau v. Mission Corp., 212 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.)
(transfer of securities between parent company and wholly owned subsidiary held not a section 16(b)
sale), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1016 (1954).
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lie offering of common stock.29 The corporation offered class A securi-
ties to the public the following year.30 The common stock was
convertible into the class A securities. Because the class A paid a higher
dividend than the common, a majority of the public shareholders con-
verted their common into class A.31 The "family insiders" continued to
hold the common stock, which paid less in dividends, thus "retaining
earnings . . . otherwise payable to family stockholders, for use in the
business, without exposing the family stockholders to potential tax liabil-
ity."' 32 The class A stock "had equal voting rights with the common,
rights on liquidation were the same, neither class was subject to redemp-
tion, and both were fully transferrable. ' '33
In 1960, the family stockholders "decided to offer a portion of their
stock interest to the public."' 34 The family converted their common stock
to class A stock prior to conducting a public offering of the class A
stock.35 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
that the conversion was not a purchase of the class A stock that could be
matched with the public sale of the class A stock for the purposes of
section 16(b). 36 The court pointed out that:
[t]he exchange ... did not interrupt the continuity of [the insiders']
investment: it did not increase or decrease the amount invested, or
alter in any way the risk assumed long years before. Moreover, since
there was no speculative advantage in holding class A rather than
Common, the exchange conferred no opportunity for speculative profit
which [the insiders] did not already enjoy. 3 7
Though also declining to treat the conversion as a "purchase" for
16(b) purposes, the Second Circuit in Lamb developed a different analy-
sis than employed in Max Factor, emphasizing the "economic equiva-
lence of convertible and underlying securities."' 38 In Lamb, the plaintiff
sought to match a conversion of convertible preferred stock into common
stock with a later sale of the common stock, much like the transaction at
issue in Park & Tilford.39 The Lamb court held that liability should not
attach:
29. Max Factor, 342 F.2d at 306.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 309.
37. Id. at 308.
38. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 521-23.
39. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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[I]n general, the purchase by an insider of his issuer's equity se-
curities, followed in less than six months by their conversion, cannot
facilitate short swing trading for speculative profits in the convertible
securities because market activity, including arbitrage trading, will in-
sure that the convertible securities have a market price at least
equivalent to the aggregate price of the securities into which they are
convertible. .... 40
Because the convertible preferred and common stock were "eco-
nomically equivalent"-that is, because the two classes of securities
traded at their conversion ratio-conversion from one to the other would
not affect the insiders' ownership position or their opportunity to profit
from inside information. 41
The Lamb court argued that in deciding "whether a certain transac-
tion is a section 16(b) 'purchase' or 'sale' it is relevant to first consider
whether the transaction in any way makes possible the unfair insider
trading that section 16(b) was designed to prevent." 42 The court's lan-
guage indicated that this threshold inquiry should be made with respect
to all types of transactions subject to section 16(b). 43 In essence, the
courts in Max Factor and Lamb looked beyond the straightforward
mechanical requirements of the statute to the economics of conversion
transactions. Because, in Max Factor, the continuity of the insiders' in-
vestments was not substantially altered by the conversion, and because,
in Lamb, the convertible and underlying securities were economically
equivalent, the courts in those cases declined to impose 16(b) liability.44
40. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 521; cf American Standard, Inc. v. Crane Co., 346 F. Supp. 1153, 1161
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (doctrine of economic equivalence applies only where securities involved are both
from same issuer), rev'd on other grounds, 510 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1974), cert denied, 421 U.S. 1000
(1975).
41. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 10.08 (Rev.
1985); see also Ferraiolo v. Newman, 259 F.2d 342, 345-46 (6th Cir. 1958) (securities were economi-
cally equivalent because conversion of convertible preferred into common stock "worked no material
change in [the insider's] proportional equity ownership"), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 927 (1959).
42. Lamb, 363 F.2d at 518.
43. The view that section 16(b) liability should not attach to transactions that provide no op-
portunity for speculative abuse remains the law in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., infra note 109 and
accompanying text; see also Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 559 F. Supp. 692, 704
(S.D.N.Y.) (where inside information is immaterial, thus eliminating any possibility of speculative
abuse, 16(b) liability does not attach), affld, 722 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984) (discussed infra note 109); Newmark v. RKO General, Inc., 425 F.2d 348, 351 n.2 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854 (1970) (rejecting the objective approach "in favor of the more 'pragmatic'
approach of applying the statute only to those situations subject to speculative manipulations").
44. For further discussion of these two cases, see infra notes 103-07 and accompanying text.
The SEC codified the holdings of Max Factor and Lamb in Rule 16b-9(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-
9(a) (1985):
(a) Any acquisition or disposition of an equity security involved in the conversion of an
equity security which, by its terms or pursuant to the terms of the corporate charter or
other governing instruments, is convertible immediately or after a stated period of time
into another equity security of the same issuer, shall be exempt from the operation of
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B. The Pragmatic Approach: Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.
The Max Factor and Lamb cases form the backdrop to the most
important case to date in determining the scope of section 16(b): Kern
County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.45 In Kern County, the
Court adopted a "pragmatic" approach to the short-swing profit provi-
sion as applied to hostile takeovers, mergers, and corporate reorganiza-
tions.46 A brief review of Kern County and its progeny demonstrates that
16(b) is not the simple but effective deterrent to short-swing insider trad-
ing intended by the provision's drafters. Instead, this review will show
that 16(b) has been continually reinterpreted by the courts in an attempt
to bring it in conformity with economic reality.4 7
Rather than subject the transaction in question to an "objective"
analysis, the Supreme Court in Kern County applied a two-step analysis
to determine whether the insider violated section 16(b). The Court first
asked whether the transaction was "unorthodox" and therefore deserv-
ing of more careful scrutiny than that afforded by literal application of
the statute.48 Having determined that the transaction was "unortho-
section 16(b) of the Act: Provided, however, That this rule shall not apply to the extent that
there shall have been either (1) a purchase of any equity security of the class convertible
(including any acquisition of or change in a conversion privilege) and a sale of any equity
security of the class issuable upon conversion, or (2) a sale of any equity security of the
class convertible and any purchase of any equity security issuable upon conversion (other-
wise than in a transaction involved in such conversion or in a transaction exempted by any
other rule under section 16(b)) within a period of less than 6 months which includes the
date of conversion.
This rule provides a safe harbor for conversion transactions by stating that conversions will not
be considered purchases or sales for the purposes of section 16(b). However, the rule provides that
the safe harbor is not available where the purchase or sale of the convertible security and purchase
or sale of the underlying security occur within a six month period including the conversion. Also,
Rule 16b-9(a) does not incorporate an economic equivalency test. See infra note 108. In other
words, there is no requirement that the convertible and underlying securities trade in relation to one
another. The rule, like 16(b) itself, was intended to be applied mechanically.
45. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
46. See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 612-30 (1983) (re-
printing and discussing Kern County); Note, Insider Liability for Short-Swing Profits: The Substance
and Function of the Pragmatic Approach, 72 MICH. L. REV. 592, 594-95 (1974) (discussing Kern
County's "possiblity of abuse test").
47. See Note, Exceptions to Liability Under Section 16(b), supra note 5, at 1432-33 (noting that
"courts have repeatedly fashioned ad hoc exemptions from the statute in circumstances appearing to
afford little opportunity for speculative abuse").
48. Kern County, 411 U.S. at 593-96. The Court referred to Professor Loss for the proposition
that the term "unorthodox" transactions refers to transactions involving "stock conversions, ex-
changes pursuant to mergers and other corporate reorganizations, stock reclassifications, and deal-
ings in options, rights and warrants." Id. at 594 n.24 (citing L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
1069 (2d ed. 1961)).
"Unorthodox" transactions are those that do not easily fit within the framework of the statute.
One commentator has noted that the "garden-variety type of situation section 16(b) was intended to
cover is readily identifiable and the right to recover in this situation is generally clear." 3B H.
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dox," the Court then addressed the question of whether the transaction
presented an opportunity for speculative abuse.49
Kern County arose from Occidental Petroleum's unsuccessful take-
over attempt of Old Kern, the "target company. ' 50 During the takeover
attempt, Occidental acquired over ten percent of Old Kern equity securi-
ties, making Occidental a statutory insider of Old Kern.51 In response to
the takeover attempt, Old Kern arranged a defensive merger with its
"white knight," Tenneco.52 As part of the merger agreement between
Old Kern and Tenneco, Tenneco agreed to exchange its own securities
for outstanding Old Kern securities. 53 Thus, Occidental exchanged its
Old Kern securities for Tenneco securities at a sizeable profit. Examin-
ing the transactions, the Supreme Court held that an exchange of securi-
ties pursuant to a merger was not automatically a "16(b) sale." Instead,
the Court labelled the transaction "unorthodox. '54 It then proceeded to
inquire whether the transaction presented an opportunity for speculative
abuse.55
The Court concluded that section 16(b) had not been violated, due
to the "involuntary nature of Occidental's . . .exchange coupled with
the absence of the possibility of speculative abuse of insider trading."'56
The Court noted that "after all, Occidental was a tender offeror, threat-
ening to seize control of Old Kern, displace its management, and use the
company for its own ends." T57 Thus, "the possibility that Occidental had,
or had the opportunity to have, any confidential information. . . seems
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41,.at § 10.01[4]. The scope of section 16(b) and the right to recover is
often unclear in transactions involving options, warrants, convertible securities, and exchanges pur-
suant to mergers.
49. Kern County, 411 U.S. at 582, 593-95.
50. Id. at 584-91.
51. Id. at 585.
52. Id. at 585-86. "White knight" has become a common term in the language of corporate
lawyers and executives. A white knight is a company invited by the target corporation to defeat the
hostile tender offer by making a separate bid. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datalab,
Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1538, 1552 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1052 (1984).
53. Id. at 586.
54. Id. at 593-94.
55. Id. at 596-99. The Court stated:
Several decisions have been read as to apply a so-called "objective" test in interpreting and
applying § 16(b). . .. Under some broad language in those decisions, § 16(b) is said to be
applicable whether or not the transaction in question could possibly lend itself to the types
of speculative abuse that the statute was designed to prevent. By far the greater weight of
authority is to the effect that a "pragmatic" approach to § 16(b) will best serve statutory
goals.
Id. at 594 n.26.
56. Id. at 600.
57. Id. at 598.
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remote." s58 The Court considered the transaction involuntary because
the defensive merger was arranged by Old Kern. The Court stated that if
Occidental had sold its Old Kern securities for cash prior to the ex-
change, it would clearly have violated 16(b).59
The Supreme Court did not entirely do away with the objective ap-
proach to section 16(b) with its decision in Kern County. Courts con-
tinue to apply the provision objectively to garden variety transactions,
and earlier "objective" approach decisions that do not involve "unortho-
dox" transactions remain good law.6 0 For example, an insider may re-
duce or entirely avoid section 16(b) liability by "splitting" his sales, thus
eliminating statutory insider status on the first sale.61 Similarly, an in-
sider may avoid liability by selling securities six months and one day
after his purchase. 62 However, predicting how section 16(b) will operate
even in these instances is sometimes difficult. Insiders have been trapped
58. Id.
59. Kern County, 411 U.S. at 599-600. Texas Int'l Airlines v. National Airlines, 714 F.2d 533
(5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984), discussed infra notes 67-84 and accompanying
text, involved just such a transaction. The unsuccessful tender offeror sold securities of the target
corporation prior to a merger and exchange of securities. Id. at 535. The Fifth Circuit followed the
dicta in Kern County and held the insider liable under section 16(b). Id at 593-40.
60. For a discussion of transactions entitled to pragmatic analysis, see Tomlinson, supra note
24, at 949.
61. See Reliance Elec. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 404 U.S. 418 (1972). In Reliance, the defend-
ant, a 10% beneficial owner, engaged in a two step sale of the target company's securities, after a
failed takeover attempt. The insider engaged in its transactions before the Kern County decision. It
therefore sold its securities prior to an exchange of securities with the surviving corporation appar-
ently because it believed that an exchange of securities pursuant io the defensive merger would be
considered a section 16(b) sale. In order to reduce the section 16(b) profits that would have resulted
from matching the sales with the purchases made less than six months earlier, the insider first re-
duced ownership to slightly below 10% by selling shares to one purchaser, then sold the remaining
securities to another purchaser. Id. at 420-21. The Supreme Court construed the statute strictly,
and matched only the first sale and the purchases that originally took the insider over the 10% mark.
Id. at 423-25. Section 16(b) provides that "this subsection shall not be construed to cover any trans-
actions where such beneficial owner was not such both at the time of purchase and sale ...." 15
U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1982). The insider thus "split" his sales of the issuer's equity securities: with the
first sale bringing the insider to less than 10% ownership, and thereby placing the second sale---of
the remainder of the insider's holdings-outside the purview of section 16(b) liability. The Reliance
Court stated:
To be sure, where alternative constructions of the terms of section 16(b) are possible, those
terms are to be given the construction that best serves the congressional purpose of curbing
short-swing speculation by corporate insiders. But a construction of the term "at the time
...of sale" that treats two sales as one upon proof of a pre-existing intent by the seller is
scarcely in harmony with the congressional design of predicating liability upon an "objec-
tive measure of proof."
Id. at 424-25 (quoting Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943)). See Comment, Section 16(b), Measuring Profits Realized in Option Transactions,
1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 855, 859-61 (discussing the Reliance two step split sale technique).
62. See Comment, supra note 61, at 859-61 (discussing "six months and a day" technique, as
well as other methods that allow insiders to structure transactions to avoid section 16(b) profits).
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when relying on such strategies. 63
Though intended to illuminate proper application of section 16(b) in
the context of unorthodox transactions, Kern County does not provide a
bright line for determining which unusual transactions will produce
16(b) profits. Even after Kern County, insiders engaging in transactions
that do not present an opportunity for speculative abuse remain subject
to section 16(b) liability.
C. The Shifting Border Between the Objective and Pragmatic Analyses:
Texas International Airlines v. National Airlines and Pay
Less Drug Stores v. Jewel Companies, Inc.
Max Factor and Lamb eliminated 16(b) liability from conversion
transactions that present no opportunity for speculative abuse. Similarly,
Kern County removed "unorthodox" transactions from the scope of the
statute where the purpose of preventing short-swing trading by insiders is
not served. These decisions eliminate any pretense that 16(b) is a "flat
rule," easily understood and enforced. In the years since Kern County,
constant litigation has defined and redefined the boundaries of section
16(b). 64 Two such recent cases are Texas International Airlines v.
63. See Reece Corp. v. Walco Nat'l Corp., 565 F. Supp. 158, 162-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). In
Reece, although the insider engaged in more that one sale, "there was a single plan of disposition
negotiated [by the insider] with the same buyer. . .. " Id. at 162. Thus, the court determined that
"from any standpoint of reality and substance, there was a single sale. The attempt to divide it into
two sales was wholly artificial and contrived." Id. In this instance, both sales were matched to
earlier purchases to arrive at section 16(b) profits. For a discussion of Reece, see Block & Barton,
Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act: An Archaic Insider Trading Statute in Need of Reform, 12 SIX.
REG. L.J. 203, 216 (1984) (examining Reliance and Reece as part of a more general analysis of the
scope of section 16(b) in hostile takeovers).
64. See, e.g., Heublein, Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 722 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983) (exchange of
stock pursuant to merger not a 16(b) sale), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984); Kay v. Scientex Corp.,
719 F.2d 1009 (2d Cir. 1983) (overissuance of shares to insider was a 16(b) purchase); Rosen v.
Drisler, 421 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (exercise of stock options not 16(b) purchase).
Section 16(b) litigation arising since Kern County has been the subject of much scholarly debate.
Commentators have proposed new or revised analyses to quell the confusion surrounding the statute,
and judicial approaches to it. For example, see Tomlinson, supra note 24, at 953-56, proposing a
single analysis for all transactions, whereby a court examines (1) whether there was a beneficial
transfer for value, (2) whether the insider made an investment decision, and (3) the timing of the
investment decision. Other commentators would focus on the insider's access to nonpublic informa-
tion. See Note, Short-Swing Profits in Failed Takeover Bids-The Role of Section 16(b), 59 WASH. L.
REV. 895, 905 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Note, Short-Swing Profits]:
The pragmatic approach that has evolved from Kern focuses on the form of the transac-
tion. The voluntary form of the transaction creates section 16(b) liability even though the
statutory insider actually lacks access to inside information. This analysis results from a
literal reading of the statute. Section 16(b) should not be literally applied, however, when
such application would not further the statute's purposes. For example, section 16(b)
should not apply when hostile takeover bidders have no access to inside information. An
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National Airlines65 and Pay Less Drug Stores v. Jewel Companies, Inc. 66
Texas International involved facts similar to Kern County. As in
Kern County, the target company defeated the insider's takeover attempt
by arranging a defensive merger.67 However, instead of simply waiting
for the merger to exchange the target company's securities for the "white
knight's" securities, the defendant, a ten percent beneficial owner, sold
the target company's securities for cash prior to the merger. 68 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed dicta in the
Kern County decision 69 and forced the insider to disgorge his profits.70
The court in Texas International held that because the transaction
was voluntary, it did not fall within the "unorthodox transaction" cate-
gory created by Kern County.71 The court therefore applied an "objec-
tive" analysis. 72 The Fifth Circuit declined "to create an exception to the
automatic 16(b) liability in cases where a defendant can prove that,
notwithstanding its ownership of over 10% of the stock of the issuer, the
approach that is more consistent with the philosophy and goals of section 16(b) examines
the position of the trader rather than the form of the transaction.
See also Note, Exceptions to Liability Under Section 16(b), supra note 5, at 1443-45 (proposing that
noncontrolling beneficial owners be presumed not to have inside information).
65. 714 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984).
66. 579 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
67. Texas Int'l, 714 F.2d at 535.
68. Id.
69. The Supreme Court stated that the hostile tender offeror in Kern County would have been
liable for section 16(b) profits if it had sold its target's securities for cash prior to the merger. Kern
County, 411 U.S. at 599-600.
70. Id. at 538-40; see supra note 59 and accompanying text.
71. Id at 540. For a discussion of "voluntariness" in the context of Kern County's pragmatic
analysis, see Note, Short-Swing Profits, supra note 64, at 900-01 (whether the insider controls the
timing of the transaction determines "voluntariness"). Because the decision to sell the target com-
pany's securities prior to the merger exchange was entirely in the hands of Texas International, the
transaction in this case could be considered voluntary.
72. Texas Int'l 714 F.2d at 538-39.
The court described the pragmatic approach adopted in Kern County as "an extremely narrow
exception to the objective standard of section 16(b)." Id. at 539. According to the court, transac-
tions that do not receive "unorthodox" status are automatically subjected to objective analysis. Id.
The court determined that even had the insider in Texas International been in an analogous position
regarding the target-that is, a hostile position--"no valid basis for an exception to section 16(b)
liability on these facts" would be stated. Id. The Fifth Circuit denied "unorthodox" status because
the transaction consisted of a voluntary cash-for-stock sale, as distinguished from the involuntary
exchange of shares pursuant to a merger that took place in Kern County. Id. at 539-40. Thus, the
court applied an objective analysis. Id.
In contrast to the Texas International court, some courts have held that transactions that take
place during a tender offer are necessarily unorthodox. See Pier 1 Imports of Georgia v. Wilson, 529
F. Supp. 239, 242-43 (N.D. Tex. 1981); Makofsky v. Ultra Dynamics Corp., 383 F. Supp. 631, 637
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also Block & Barton, supra note 63, at 209 (listing these cases, and discussing
Texas Int'l).
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defendant had no access to inside information." 73
As already noted by commentators, the decision in Texas Interna-
tional was unfortunate. If the issuer and the tender offeror occupy hos-
tile positions, there is no reason to believe that greater opportunity for
speculative abuse exists where the offeror sells its securities prior to the
merger, than where it waits to exchange its securities pursuant thereto.74
As in Kern County, Texas International was a "tender offeror, threaten-
ing to seize control of [the issuer], displace its management, and use the
company for its own ends."'75
A recent case reaches an opposite conclusion on the issue of whether
a voluntary transaction can be "unorthodox. ' 76 The transactions at issue
in Pay Less Drug Stores v. Jewel Companies, Inc. 77 emerged from Jewel's
failed attempt to take over Pay Less Drug Stores. Pay Less sought to
match Jewel's exercise of options to purchase Pay Less shares with
Jewel's later sales of those same Pay Less shares. 78
The court held that exercise of the options was an "unorthodox"
transaction, 79 recognizing that trading in options will often be unortho-
73. Texas Int'l, 714 F.2d at 538. One commentator has suggested that in examining tender
offer transactions, courts should "allow the insider to prove that no improper speculation occurred"
in those cases where the insider can rebut the presumption of access to insider information. The
commentator argued that this defense be available to an insider regardless of whether the transaction
was voluntary. See Note, Short-Swing Profits, supra note 64, at 905-06.
74. See Note, Short-Swing Profits, supra note 64, at 906 ("takeover bidder exchanging shares for
stock within six months is arguably in the same position as the takeover bidder exchanging shares for
cash"). This commentator has noted that there may be powerful financial reasons for a losing tender
offeror to sell its shares of the target prior to the defensive merger. For example, the offeror may
have borrowed considerable sums to finance the offer, and may therefore desire to repay the debt
quickly to avoid interest payments. Id.
75. See Texas Int'l, 714 F.2d at 536; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
76. Even though factually different than Texas International, Pay Less Drug Stores v. Jewel
Cos., 579 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1984), nonetheless stands for the proposition that the volitional
character of a transaction does not automatically preclude "unorthodox" status. Id. at 1400-01. See
infra notes 77-81 and accompanying text.
77. 579 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
78. Id. at 1399. Jewel bought the options from Pay Less shareholders with the understanding
that they would not be exercised unless the Jewel tender offer failed. Id. at 1397. Jewel attempted to
exercise its options to buy Pay Less shares on two separate occasions, but the Pay Less shareholders
who had granted the options to purchase their shares refused to sell. Jewel successfully enforced its
option contract in court. Id. at 1398. Actual purchase of these shares took place by court order,
beyond the six months proscribed by section 16(b). Pay Less thus sought to match Jewel's sales of
its stock with the attempted exercise of options to purchase Pay Less stock. Id.
Pay Less asserted four separate claims. In three, Jewel's alleged section 16(b) purchase con-
sisted of one of the two attempts to exercise the option. In a fourth claim, Pay Less argued that
Jewel "purchased" Pay Less shares when it made the decision to exercise the options. The alleged
sales consisted of either the involuntary sale occurring as part of the eventual cash-out merger, or
Pay Less's voluntary sale of a block of shares prior to the cash-out merger. Id. at 1398-99.
79. Id. at 1399.
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dox.80 More importantly, the Pay Less court held that a transaction may
be "unorthodox," and thus subject to "pragmatic" analysis, even though
the transaction is entirely voluntary."' Thus, while Texas International
tells insiders that the volitional nature of a transaction will distinguish
"unorthodox" transactions from "garden variety" purchases and sales, 2
Pay Less informs insiders that the volitional character of a transaction
should not prevent the transaction from receiving "unorthodox" status. 83
Texas International and Pay Less present opposing judicial re-
sponses to application of section 16(b). This difference can be character-
ized as something more than a disagreement over what transactions the
Supreme Court intended the term "unorthodox transaction" to include.
The transactions from which section 16(b) litigation arises tend to be
unusual or complex, or else result from contingencies that the statute
seems unprepared to address.84 The Pay Less court, like the Max Factor,
Lamb, and Kern County courts preceeding it, recognized that section
16(b) should not be applied where the substance and economics of a class
of transactions do not present an opportunity for speculative abuse of
inside information.8 5 In contrast, the Texas International court applied
80. Id. at 1400; see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
81. Id. at 1400-01. The court stated:
While the majority opinion in Texas International stressed the fact that the defendant in
that case had engaged in voluntary trades, in contrast with the involuntary conversion of
shares that had occurred in Kern, this court believes that Kern should not be read to make
volitional character of the transaction the sole inquiry in deciding whether a transaction is
"unorthodox." The Supreme Court's opinion in Kern indicated that an analysis of the
potential for speculative abuse should be made in cases involving "unorthodox" transac-
tions. It did not limit the definition of unorthodox transactions to cases involving involun-
tary exchanges. Thus, this court concludes that the facts of the present case, despite the
volitional nature of Jewel's attempted exercise of the option, present a sufficiently unortho-
dox transaction to warrant the application of the Kern analysis.
Id.
The court in Pay Less recognized that the transaction at issue "hardly presents the 'orthodox'
purchase-sale type of transaction that was involved in Texas International. In that case, the defend-
ant had purchased shares on the open market pursuant to a tender offer, and later sold those shares
... " Id. at 1400. Unlike Texas International, Payless involved options, and no shares changed
hands. Id. at 1400.
82. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
84. Cf. 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, § 10.01[4] ("[Tihere is a significant amount of
litigation under section 16(b) suggesting that it often becomes a trap for the unwary."). Though
occasionally the fault of counsel, it is also the "result of the possible application of the section to a
number of situations which are not of the garden variety type."). Id.
85. A view that courts should be prepared to examine many types of unusual transactions, and
not just those fitting within one set of criteria, seems to be presented in Kern County:
Under some broad language in [earlier] decisions, § 16(b) is said to be applicable whether
or not the transaction could possibly lend itself to the types of speculative abuse that the
statute was designed to prevent. By far the greater weight and authority is to the effect that
a pragmatic approach to § 16(b) will best serve statutory goals.
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 n.26 (1973).
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section 16(b) to a type of transaction that seemed to provide no such
opportunity for abuse.86
III. PURCHASE AND SALE OF CONVERTIBLE DEBENTURES AND
UNDERLYING SECURITIES: THE NEED FOR AN ECONOMIC
EQUIVALENCY TEST
Gund v. First Florida Banks87 follows the lead of Texas Interna-
tional by mechanically applying section 16(b) to a series of transactions
that provide no opportunity for speculative abuse.88 This case represents
a misapplication of the statute and highlights the need for courts to fol-
low the underlying rationale of Max Factor, Lamb, Kern County, and
Pay Less by refusing to find liability where the economics of a class of
transactions eliminates the possibility of speculative abuse.
Gund involved a sale of convertible debentures and subsequent
purchase of common stock within six months.89 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held the insider liable for 16(b)
profits, despite the fact that the price of the debentures was fluctuating in
relation to interest rates.90 The insider argued that if the market price of
convertible securities is not fluctuating at levels implied by the conver-
sion ratio, the two classes of securities should not be "matched" for 16(b)
purposes. 91 That is, he contended that if the two classes of securities
86. See supra notes 65-75 and accompanying text.
87. 726 F.2d 682 (11th Cir. 1984).
88. See infra notes 89-114 and accompanying text.
89. Gund, 726 F.2d at 683-84.
90. Id at 687. One other case has treated the issue of whether courts should match purchases
or sales of convertible debentures with the underlying common stock. In Chemical Fund, Inc. v.
Xerox Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 91,653 (W.D.N.Y. March 28,
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967), the district court matched an insider's
purchase of convertible debentures and sale of common stock. Id. at 91,418-19. In that case, unlike
Gund, market prices of the two classes of securities were trading in relation to one another at their
fixed conversion ratio. Id. at 91,418. Thus, that case is entirely distinguishable from Gund; it is
precisely the fact that the convertible debentures were not trading in relation to the common stock
that allowed Gund to argue that he should have escaped section 16(b) liability. Gund, 726 F.2d at
685.
91. Id. at 685. Gund argued that:
[Tihe debentures were selling as fixed-price debt securities during the relevant period and
that their price was influenced solely by fluctuation in interest rates, with the conversion
feature of the debentures rendered meaningless due to the drastic drop in the market price
of the common stock. Gund argues that the factors which would affect common stock
prices could therefore not affect debenture prices, and vice versa. Thus, Gund's sales and
purchases were not "matching transactions" so as to give rise to the type of short swing
profits addressed by section 16(b).
Id.
Professor Loss has stated that the "scant authority on the question of matching a purchase of
one security with the sale of another is not conclusive." L. Loss, supra note 46 at 629. He notes that
where the two securities are economic equivalents, "it is desirable to match the purchase and sale for
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were not trading at prices implied by the conversion ratio, there was no
opportunity for speculative abuse.92
The 6-7/8% convertible debentures and common stock were related
in the following way. The debentures were issued in $1000 denomina-
tions, and were convertible into 82.47 shares of common stock at a con-
version price of $12-1/8 per share.93 From 1971 to 1973, both securities
"traded near the levels implied in their offering prices, i.e. the debentures
sold for roughly their face value [$1000] and the [common] stock traded
in the neighborhood of $12." 94 Beginning in 1974, the markets for both
securities declined. By 1976, the convertible debentures were trading at
only seventy-five percent of their issue price. 95 The common stock, how-
ever, was selling at only fifty percent of its issue price.96 Thus, at this
time the debentures were no longer trading at their fixed conversion
ratio.97
Gund, a director of First Florida,98 had purchased $605,000 in con-
vertible debentures during 1972 and 1973. From July 1976 to March
1977, after the markets for the two classes of First Florida securities de-
clined, Gund sold his entire debenture holdings.99 Gund purchased
77,000 shares of common stock with the proceeds of the debenture sales.
Had Gund converted his debentures, instead of selling them, he would
have received only 49,895 shares of common stock. i°
The Eleventh Circuit held that section 16(b) literally applied to
Gund's transactions, because, as an insider, he sold and purchased the
First Florida equity securities within a six month period. 10 1 According
16(b) purposes." Id. at 628-29, 653 (specifically approving the matching of convertible debentures
and common stock, as long as the securities are economic equivalents).
92. Gund, 726 F.2d at 686.
93. Id. at 684.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id Normally, convertible debentures "considered by the market to be the substantial
equivalent of the common stock. . . will rise in price with the common if the market price of the
common, on adjustment for the conversion ratio, exceeds the call price for the debentures." L. Loss,
supra note 46, at 653.
Conversely, where "conversion of debentures is not economical, it is their senior position and
fixed interest claim that give them value." Id For example, if Gund had converted his debentures
to common stock, Gund would have received only 50% of the offering price of the securities. How-
ever, because bonds are interest-bearing instruments, the coupon rate placed a floor on their price.
Thus, at the time Gund sold his debentures, those securities were trading as "pure" bonds-that is,
trading in relation to interest rates.
98. As a director, Gund was an "insider" for purposes of section 16(b). See supra note 3 and
accompanying text.
99. Gund, 726 F.2d at 684.
100. Id at 684-85.
101. Id. at 687. The court's analysis, in pertinent part, was as follows:
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to the Eleventh Circuit, if a transaction falls within the "literal language"
of section 16(b), the courts may not examine the transaction to see
whether there was a potential for speculative abuse. Thus, the court did
not even have to reach the question of speculative abuse, since according
to the court, no "unorthodox" transaction was involved. 0 2
The. underlying rationale of Blau v. Lamb 0 3 would not allow the
matching of a sale and purchase of convertible and underlying securities
where the classes of securities involved were not trading at prices con-
forming to their fixed conversion ratio.'04 Lamb demonstrated that
where securities of the same issuer are economically equivalent-that is,
where they trade at their conversion ratio-the conversion of one into the
other does not change the insider's investment position, and should not
be considered a purchase or sale under the statute. 0 5 Logically, where
the securities are economically equivalent, the sale of the convertible se-
curity and purchase of the underlying security is equivalent to the sale
and purchase of the same security, and should be matched. 0 6 Con-
Under [the]. . . "subjective" or "pragmatic" approach, an initial determination is made as
to whether a transaction falls within the literal language of section 16(b). If an ambiguity
is apparent, the inquiry becomes whether the transaction involved carries a potential for
inside abuse. Only those transactions which are susceptible to abuse are found to be within
statutory scope.
However, the law is clear that the pragmatic approach is to be used to determine the
boundaries of section 16(b)'s definitional scope only in borderline situations, particularly
those involving unorthodox transactions.
Id
102. Id. at 686-87. The Eleventh Circuit did not elaborate or define its conception of an "unor-
thodox" transaction. It merely stated that the "vast majority of cases in which the pragmatic ap-
proach has been followed involve involuntary transactions which are triggered by corporate
reorganization." Id. at 686. The Supreme Court's language in Kern County is broader, however,
referring to trading in warrants, options, and conversions as possible instances of "unorthodox"
transactions. Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 593 n.24 (1973);
see supra note 40 and accompanying text. The court in Pay Less Drug Stores v. Jewel Cos., 579 F.
Supp. 1396, 1400-01 (N.D. Cal. 1984), argued that "unorthodox" transaction status is broad enough
to include voluntary transactions. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
103. 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
104. See supra notes 26-44 and accompanying text. This is essentially the situation presented in
Chemical Fund, Inc. v. Xerox Corp., [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
1 91,653 (W.D.N.Y. March 28, 1966), rev'don other grounds, 377 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967), discussed
supra note 90.
105. See 3B H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 41, § 10.08 ("The underlying basis for the approach
of the Second Circuit is the fact that it views the [convertible and underlying securities] as [eco-
nomic] equivalents.")
106. It is unlikely that insiders would often sell convertible debentures and purchase common
stock when the securities are trading at their fixed conversion ratio. There is no investment rationale
for such action. The insider would most likely avoid transaction costs and convert the securities.
However, an insider might sell the debentures and later purchase stock in order to recognize a loss
for tax purposes, or in order to solve immediate cash flow problems. Thus, there remains the possi-
bility that, even when the securities are economically equivalent, an insider may engage in transac-
tions similar to those which took place in Gund.
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versely, where the securities are not economically equivalent, sale of the
convertible security and purchase of the underlying security is not the
same, in the eyes of the insider or the investing public, and should not be
matched. 107
At the time of Gund's transactions, the First Florida convertible
debentures were trading at seventy-five percent of their issue price, while
the common stock traded at only fifty percent of its issue price. The
securities matched in Gund were thus not economically equivalent. Sales
of convertible debentures and purchases of common stock were not the
same as sales and purchases of the same securities. Such transactions,
when examined under the rationale of Lamb, should escape liablity. 05
Any First Florida security holder with a portfolio of debentures and a
goal of increasing ownership of the corporation would have sold deben-
tures and bought common stock rather than convert. Inside information
was not necessary to arrive at such a strategy. 109
107. See L. Loss, supra note 46, at 653-54 (where conversion of debentures into stock is not
economical, debentures are not the same class of security as the stock, and should not be matched
with the stock).
108. This proposal raises an interesting point regarding Rule 16b-9(a). Rule 16b-9(a) provides a
safe harbor for conversion transactions. See supra note 44. The rule did not incorporate an eco-
nomic equivalency test. As the Eleventh Circuit noted, Gund is excluded from using this safe harbor
because he did not convert his debentures into common stock, but instead sold debentures and
bought common stock. Gund v. First Florida Banks, 726 F.2d 682, 687, 687 n.7 (11th Cir. 1984).
There is, however, no language in Rule 16b-9(a) stating that the safe harbor it provides is exclusive.
The court was thus not bound by the rule to force Gund to disgorge profits. The rule does not in any
way prohibit the use of an economic equivalency test as proposed by this note.
109. In other words, inside information was almost certainly not the motivation for the the
Gund transactions. An investor would need only an elementary understanding of mathematics to
determine that converting debentures in this situation would produce fewer common stock shares
than selling his debentures and purchasing common stock.
Several cases have already stated that when inside information can in no way motivate a series
of purchases and sales, insiders are not subject to section 16(b) liability. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., v. Livingston, 566 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1978); Heublein, Inc. v. General
Cinema Corp., 559 F. Supp. 692, 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 722 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1066 (1984). These courts argued that, if the information known to the insiders
could not lead to an investment decision, speculative abuse could not result. Furthermore these
courts argued that 16(b) liability should not attach if there is no opportunity for speculative abuse.
Similarly, speculative abuse in Gund was not a concern because the very economics of the transaction
made inside information irrelevant.
In Heublein, no formal tender offer was made. Instead, the issuer engaged in a merger, prior to
any tender offer, to rid itself of an "unwelcome investor," General Cinema Corporation. Heublein,
559 F. Supp. at 702. General Cinema had been buying shares of the issuer to a point where it
eventually held 18.9% of the total number of outstanding shares. At the time when General Cinema
reached a 16.2% ownership level, the issuer engaged in negotiations for an "asset swap" with Gen-
eral Cinema, in order to persuade General Cinema to discontinue buying the issuer's shares. Id. at
694. During these negotiations the issuer disclosed to General Cinema nonpublic information which
the issuer concedes was "nonmaterial" under federal securities laws-information which could not
be speculatively exploited for section 16(b) purposes. Id. at 704. The court held that, under Kern
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Because the Gund court determined that section 16(b) applied liter-
ally to the transaction, it stated that the court was precluded from exam-
ining the substance and economics of the transactions to determine
whether there was potential for speculative abuse.110 In other words, the
court equated the Gund transaction with the most basic section 16(b)
violation: the purchase and sale of stock on the market within six
months. An argument can be made, however, that the provision does not
apply to the sale of convertible debentures and purchase of common
stock so clearly as to preclude any further examination.
Under section 3(a)(11) of the Act, "equity security" includes "any
stock or similar security or any security convertible . . . into such secur-
ity."11' Convertible debentures are thus equity securities for purposes of
section 16(b) only because of their conversion feature. Without a conver-
sion feature, purchases and sales of debentures or any other debt securi-
ties could not be matched with purchases and sales of common stock to
form section 16(b) violations. Convertible preferred stock, by contrast, is
not dependent upon its conversion feature to be matched with common
stock to form section 16(b) violations. Convertible preferred stock is an
equity security under section 3(a)(1 1) because it is "stock or [a] similar
security. .. ."
The Gund court might have looked to the worthlessness of the de-
bentures' conversion feature, and questioned whether, for purposes of
Gund's transactions, the convertible debentures were equity securities."12
County, an unorthodox transaction was stated. Further, it held that nonmaterial inside information
does not present an opportunity for speculative abuse. Id. at 703-05.
110, See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 78(a)(1 1) (1982) (emphasis added).
112. Though the language of section 3(a)(l 1) is broad in defining any convertible security as an
equity security, it would not be unreasonable to read the language as implying that in order to be an
equity security, the conversion feature must have value.
The legislative history of section 3(a)(l 1) does not address this point. Instead, it emphasizes
merely that the definition of equity security was intended to include any securities of a speculative
nature. Thus, for example, long term, interest-bearing bonds were excluded from the definition. See
Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency on S Res.
84, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 7541-43 (1934). In those hearings, the Senate Committee considered a
provision to section 3(a)(1 1) that would have removed any "preferred or guaranteed stock which is
entitled to receive only a fixed or limited dividend," from the definition of equity security. Id. at
7541. In the debate that followed, an attorney for the New York Stock Exchange attempted to
convince the senators that such securities do not pose speculative risks. This provision was not
included in the final definition of section 3(a)(1 1). See supra note 16.
The committee did not examine the issue raised by the conversion feature of convertible debt
instruments or the speculative risks associated with such securities. Arguably, where the conversion
feature is worthless, convertible debentures pose no greater speculative risks than do nonconvertible
debentures. But see Armour & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 78,025
(convertible debentures are equity securities of corporation into whose underlying securities they are
convertible; no discussion whether conversion feature has value).
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The First Florida common stock was so greatly devalued that the price
of the debentures fluctuated solely with the interest rates. In this envi-
ronment, converting the debentures produced fewer common stock
shares than simply selling debentures and purchasing common stock on
the market. Indeed, only an insider, because of potential section 16(b)
liability, would even consider converting his securities.
There appears to be only one scenario in which Gund could have
used inside information to guide and profit from his transactions. Per-
haps Gund had information that the common stock, which was even
more devalued than the convertible debentures, would soon increase in
price relative to the debentures.1 3 Trading on this information, he could
have rearranged his portfolio to maximize his common stock holdings.
Thus, instead of converting the debentures to common stock, he sold the
debentures and purchased the common stock on the open market. If the
common stock price then increased, he would profit from these
transactions.
In this scenario, Gund's profits from the use of inside information
would come from a subsequent sale of the common stock matched with
the purchase of the common stock. Yet these are not the profits the
Eleventh Circuit forced Gund to disgorge. Gund was held liable for
profits resulting from the sales of debentures and the purchases of com-
mon stock.114 The fact that he sold the convertible debentures in order
to generate the capital to purchase the common stock should not matter.
The capital could just as easily have come from another source. In effect,
113. After a sufficient price increase in the common stock, to the point where the common stock
approached 75% of its issue price, the debentures would again begin to trade in relation to the
common stock. However, there is no reason to expect that the debentures would trade in relation to
the common stock at any time before the common stock approached 75% of its issue price. The
common stock could thus increase in price relative to the debentures, from 50% to 75% of its issue
price, without a proportionate increase in the price of the debentures.
114. The Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's computation of the profits to be disgorged.
Gund, 726 F.2d at 687-88. The district court used the computation method suggested by Rule 16b-
6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.16b-6 (1985). That rule matches actual sale prices of the underlying security with
the lowest market price of the underlying security occurring within six months of the sale. Rule 16b-
6 was intended to measure profits resulting from an exercise of stock options, matched with the later
sales of the underlying securities. The district court used this method by analogy, and matched the
actual purchase price of the common stock with the highest market price of the common stock
occurring withinsix- months of the sale of the debentures. Gund, 726 F.2d at 687.
The Eleventh Circuit stated that "were we writing on a clean slate," it would employ the com-
putation method developed by Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 320
U.S. 751 (1943). Gund, 726 F.2d at 687-688. The Smolowe method involves matching the highest
sale price received by the insider for the issuer's equity securities with the lowest purchase price paid
by the insider for the issuer's equity securities within a given six month period. See generally Com-
ment, supra note 61 at 865-67 (explaining Smolowe, and discussing modem problems arising from
application of the method to option transactions).
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the Gund court punished an insider for profits he may or may not have
made on transactions other than the ones at issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit reached an incorrect result in Gund v. First
Florida Banks. The holdings in Blau v. Max Factor & Co. and Blau v.
Lamb' '5-that conversions of economically equivalent securities are not
sales or purchases for the purposes of section 16(b)-support this conclu-
sion. The two classes of securities in Gund were not economically
equivalent. In this situation, the rationale for treating convertible deben-
tures as equity securities for the purposes of section 16(b) does not apply.
Thus, where convertible debentures and underlying securities are being
traded independently, sales and purchases of the convertible and under-
lying securities should not be matched.' 1 6
Daniel B. Bogart
115. See supra notes 36-40.
116. One last example of section 16(b)'s operational dysfunction may help demonstrate the il-
logic of holding Gund liable for his transaction. Gund was forced to disgorge profits that resulted
from selling convertible securities, and buying underlying securities, even though the two classes of
securities were trading independently. Under present law, however, it is conceivable that courts
would not match the sale of warrants and the purchase of common stock, even though the two
classes of securities invariably trade in relation to each other.
This result may occur because courts have matched the exercise of warrants with the sale of
common stock. See Morales v. Mapco, Inc., 541 F.2d 233, 235-36 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub
nom. Ross v. Morales, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977). The Mapco court reasoned that, because warrants
require a fixed exercise price and do not give its owner an equity position in the issuer, warrants and
common stock are not economically equivalent securities. Id. at 236. However, the sale of warrants
and purchase of common stock would provide an opportunity for speculative abuse because the
classes of securities trade together. This transaction would be equivalent to buying and selling com-
mon stock. The better result would be to match the purchase and sale of these two classes of securi-
ties. Cf Tomlinson, supra note 24, at 959-60 (suggesting that "acquisition of the option is
acquisition of beneficial ownership of the underlying stock," and arguing that a sale of stock within
six months should be matched with a purchase of an option). It would be inconsistent to hold Gund
liable on a transaction that presented no opportunity for speculative abuse, when other transactions
that do present such an opportunity may escape liability.
